The first section of this paper focuses on the on the composition of industry, and the size distributheoretical rationale and empirical evidence for why tion of firms? What is the relative importance of financial development aids industrial growth. In the financial institutions and financial markets, and does second section, we compare and contrast two types it depend on the stage of economic growth? How do of financial system: the institution-heavy relation financial systems differ in their vulnerability to ship-based system, and the market-intensive arm's crisis? This paper attempts to provide an answer to length system. We will ask which type of system is these questions based on the current state of empirimore suitable for industrial growth. In particular, we cal research. This is not, however, meant to be a focus on what seems to be a recent hybrid-venture comprehensive survey. Instead, we hope to present capital financing. In the last section, we ask how each kind of system responds to macroeconomic volatility and systemic risk. We conclude with some policy conjectures.
II. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH
There is a long literature debating the impact of finance on growth-dating at least as far back as Schumpeter (1911) -that emphasizes the positive influence of the development of a country's finan cial sector on the level and the rate of growth of its per-capita income. The argument essentially is that the services the financial sector provides-allocat ing capital and risk appropriately in the economyare an important catalyst of economic growth. Early empirical work seemed consistent with this argu ment. For example, on the basis of data from 35 countries between 1860 and 1963 , Goldsmith (1969 concludes that 'a rough parallelism can be observed between economic and financial develop ment if periods of several decades are considered' and 'there are even indications in the few countries for which data are available that periods of more rapid economic growth have been accompanied, though not without exception, by an above-average rate of financial development.'
Nevertheless, studies such as these simply suggest correlation. As Goldsmith ( 1969) puts it, There is no possibility, however, of establishing with confidence the direction of the causal mechanism, i.e., of deciding whether financial factors were responsible for the acceleration of economic development or whether financial development reflected economic growth whose mainsprings must be sought elsewhere.
While Goldsmith (1969) was somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of establishing causation, other economists have expressed downright scepticism that financial development is anything but a side show to economic development. Robinson ( 1952, p. 86 ) is representative of a school which seems to believe that institutions follow the inverse of Say's law, that demand creates its own supply, when she claims, 'Where enterprise leads, finance follows.'
Others, such as Lucas (1988) , argue that the impor tance of financial development has been overem phasized.
The importance of the role financial markets and institutions play in an economy is undisputed and fairly well documented elsewhere (see Levine (1997) , for example). What is disputed is whether financial markets and institutions appear on de mand. If they do not, then the underdevelopment of financial markets and institutions would prevent an immediate response to industrial needs, and would retard the growth of a country. Recent evidence suggests this may be the case.
(i) Evidence on Financial Development and
Growth
The rekindling of interest in the empirical connection between financial development and growth owes much to King and Levine (1993) year in the 1970s, and by 1980 per-capita GDP would have been 9 per cent above its actual level (King and Levine, 1993, p. 734) .
While the evidence in their paper sheds additional light, it does not lay to rest all doubts about causality. The sceptic could still offer a number of counter arguments.
First, both financial development and growth could be driven by a common omitted variable, such as Using firm-level data, they estimate the proportion of firms whose rate of growth exceeds the growth that could have been supported only by internal resources. They then run a cross-country regression and find that this proportion is positively related to the stock market turnover and to a measure of law enforcement.
While their paper is similar in spirit to Rajan and Zingales (1998a) , there are two essential differences. First, their estimate of the internal growth rate of a firm is dependent on the firm's characteristics. While it is potentially more accurate than Raj an and Zingales's measure of external dependence, it is also more endogenous. Second, they focus on between-country differences in the spirit of traditional cross-country regressions, while Rajan and Zingales's focus is on within-country, between-industry differences.
struction' that would not even get initiated in coun tries with less developed markets.
Wurgler (2000) What do we make of these findings? Once we think of fixed assets as collateral, then interpretation becomes much easier. Typically, equity-financed industries tend to have few hard assets, and sub stantial intangible assets such as growth opportuni ties (see Myers, 1977) . In economies with underde veloped financial markets and institutions, collateral is essential to obtain outside financing. Thus we would expect industries that would optimally use few hard assets if financing was easy to come by, to use more of them in countries with underdevel oped financial systems. Thus the finding that as accounting standards and credit markets develop, equity-financed industries tend to use less fixed capital. In other words, the intangible assets that they typically possess in abundance become easier to finance, and they do not have to distort asset holdings towards fixed capital. Carlin and Mayer's (1998) other findings are also consistent with the above interpretation. Because the intangible assets in equity-financed firms be come easier to finance as the financial system develops (where development is measured as better accounting standards, or more bank credit), the industry grows faster, and can finance more re search and development-one of the biggest sources of intangible assets. Similarly, a highly skilled work force is an important intangible asset, and the finding that industries with highly skilled workers tend to grow more and do more research and development as financial markets develop, corroborates our in terpretation. Finally, industries dependent on bank finance in Japan (which is where Carlin and Mayer (1998) measure bank dependence) tend to be physical, capital-intensive, smoke-stack in dustries (see Hoshi et al., 1990a) . When financial markets and institutions are poorly developed, these industries have excess collateral and can invest in intangible activities such as research and develop ment that others would undertake if financial con straints were not important. As finance develops, these industries lose their comparative advantage, and tend to grow less, and do less research and development.
In sum, it appears that industries can raise finance more easily as the financial system develops be cause physical collateral becomes less important, 4 Following the methodology in Rajan and Zingales ( 1998a) , Carlin and Mayer ( 1998) proxy for an industry's dependence on equity by the amount of equity that industry uses to finance investment in the United States. They measure the industry's dependence on bank finance by how much that industry uses in Japan, and they measure the industry's use of skilled workers based on how many workers in that industry in Germany are not classified as unskilled.
while intangible assets and future cash flows can be financed.
The Carlin and Mayer (1998) findings may also explain why firms in industries dependent on exter nal finance are born more easily in countries with well-developed markets. When firms start out, many of their assets are intangible ideas and project opportunities. Thus financial development, by ena bling these assets to be financed, acts as an impor tant engine of growth.
There are also some puzzling aspects to the findings.
Some developed countries have both good account ing standards (which, across countries, is strongly positively correlated with stock-market capitaliza tion) and a high proportion of bank lending, but in general these countries are exceptions. In fact, Carlin and Mayer (1998) To answer these questions, we have to ask how relationship-based systems work and how are they different from arm's-length systems. This is the subject of the next section.
III. RELATIONSHIP-BASED VERSUS ARM'S-LENGTH SYSTEMS
Let us begin with a sketch of the salient features of these two kinds of systems. Like all sketches, this one has elements of caricature, but this is the price we have to pay to avoid being distracted by the details.
A financial system has two primary goals: to place risks where they are best borne, and to channel resources to their most productive uses. If re sources are to flow easily, it is important that the lender feel confident of the prospect of an adequate return.
As Rajan and Zingales ( 1998Z>) argue, relationship based systems ensure a return to the financier by granting her some form of power over the firm being financed. The simplest form of power is when the financier has (implicit or explicit) ownership of the firm. The financier can also serve as the sole or main lender, supplier, or customer. In all of these forms, the financier attempts to secure her return on investment by retaining some kind of monopoly over the firm she finances. As with every monopoly, this requires some barriers to entry. These barriers may be due to regulation, or to a lack of transparencyor 'opacity'-of the system, which substantially raises the costs of entry to potential competitors.
Contrast this with the arm's-length, Anglo-Saxon, market-based system, where the financier is pro tected by explicit contracts and transparency. In such systems, contracts and associated prices de termine the transactions that are undertaken. As a result, institutional relationships matter less and the market becomes a more important medium for directing/governing the terms of transactions.
An important distinction between these two sys tems is their different degree of reliance on legal enforcement. Relationship-based systems can sur vive in environments where laws are poorly drafted and contracts not enforced. The relationship is largely self-governing; parties intent on maintaining their 'reputations' honour the spirit of the agreement (often in the absence of any written contract) in order to ensure a steady flow of future business within the same network of firms. By contrast, the prompt and unbiased enforcement of contracts by courts is a precondition for the viability of a market based system. Moreover, since contracts are typi cally hard to write with the wealth of detail neces sary fully to govern transactions, it is important that the law offer a helping hand.
Another distinction between the two systems is the relative importance of transparency. Market-based systems require transparency as a guarantee of protection. In the words of Justice Brandéis, as echoed by Franklin Roosevelt, ' Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policemen' (Seligman, 1995) . By contrast, relationship-based systems are designed to pre serve opacity, which has the effect of protecting the relationships from the threat of competition. This probably explains the negative correlation between accounting standards and the size of the banking sector that we noted earlier. In assessing the bor rowing needs of the firm and its ability to pay interest and principal, the bank will consider not only the firm's current debt-servicing capability, but also its long-term ability to repay, and the various non contractual levers the bank can push to extract repayment.5 The interest rate charged will be re peatedly negotiated over time, and may not have a direct relationship to the intrinsic risk of the project.
In an arm's-length system, by contrast, the firm will be able to tap a wider circle of potential lenders because there will be more widespread financial information about it. The loan will be contracted for a specific period, and the interest rate will be a competitive one that will compensate the lender for time and the risk of that particular loan.
Limitations on competition in a relationship-based system do not just give the financier power, but also strengthen his incentive to cooperate with the bor rower. Studies of Japanese keiretsus show that the main banks went out of their way to help financially distressed borrowers. For example, Sumitomo Bank not only effectively guaranteed Mazda ' s debts when it got into trouble after the first oil shock, but also orchestrated a rescue, in part by exhorting employ ees within its keiretsu to buy Mazda cars (Hoshi et al., 19906 ). Sumitomo's incentive to help would have been considerably weaker if Mazda had had the option of giving the lion's share of its business, once it emerged from distress, to some other bank.
As this example suggests, the effective limitations throughout the USA,7 their study finds that in 'concentrated' markets (those where most of the lending is done by a handful of banks)-which are likely to be more relationship-oriented for the rea sons discussed earlier-more credit is available to young firms than in more competitive banking mar kets. To the extent young firms are more credit rationed, as many observers have suggested, the evidence suggests that the relationship-based sys tem does a better job of ensuring that value-adding projects get funded.
The study also finds that the interest rates charged to younger firms are, on average, lower in concen trated markets than in competitive markets, with the effect reversing for older firms. This suggests that banks in concentrated markets can offer more credit on economic terms because their relation ships allow ' inter-temporal cross-subsidies ' ; that is, below-market rates for younger firms that are compensated for by above-market rates for more mature firms that have a higher ability to pay. Such subsidies, as suggested earlier, would not be possi ble in more competitive markets.
Recent studies have found further evidence sugges tive of the role of relationships. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) show that while a concentrated banking system in a country has a general depressing effect on growth, it does facilitate credit access to indus tries where young firms need a lot of external finance, and enhances their relative growth rate.
Similarly, there has been work showing relation ships help in financial distress, ranging from the pioneering effort by Hoshi et al. (1990tí) to more recent work on banking relationships in the Asian financial crisis (e.g. Ferri et al., 2000) .
Clearly, it is this kind of ability to 'internalize joint surplus'-that is, to trade off short-run losses for longer-run gains-that led so many observers, in cluding many economists, to defend the efficiency of relationship-based systems. But it is also easy to see the problems that can arise in such systems. This is not to say that the arm's-length system is perfect in the allocation of resources. Because outsiders have little power, management can in dulge itself far more in empire-building without triggering an intervention by outsiders. This problem has been labelled the 'agency costs of free cash flows' by Michael Jensen(1986) . The arm's-length system, however, can use takeovers to rectify this problem when it gets excessive.8 By contrast, the problem of misallocation of resources owing to the lack of price signals in the relationship-based system is more severe, because it lacks a self-activating mechanism to correct it. In fact, even if price signals were accurate, the power structures in the relation ship-based system may not allow movement in a direction indicated by the prices.
Evidence of this unwillingness to respond to market signals is provided by Hoshi et al. ( 1991 ) . The study looked at a sample of Japanese firms in the late 1970s to mid-1980s that had close ties to banks and compared their investment behaviour with a sample that had no such ties. The investments of firms that had no bank ties were very sensitive to the cash flow the firms generated from operations; when operat ing cash flows decreased sharply, so did investment spending, and vice versa. By contrast, the invest ments of firms with strong ties to the banks were significantly less sensitive to the firms' operating cash flow.
As suggested earlier, one possible interpretation of these findings is that banking relationships make it easier for firms to obtain external funding for value adding investments, thus making them less depend ent on their own cash flows. But recent events in Japan suggest a different explanation. More often than not, the companies' continuous access to bank funding on favourable terms allowed them to ignore the signal sent by their poor cash flows, and to continue investing. By continuing to invest in these circumstances, such firms may well have been destroying long-term value rather than increasing or preserving it. Even if the banks were failing to provide the managers of these firms with the right signals, it appears that the stock market was at tempting to do so. For, as the study also reports, the firms with banking relationships in their sample had lower 'Tobin's q' (or market-to-replacement cost) ratios than firms without bank ties (consistent with our earlier conjecture that bank-dependent firms are asset-intensive, low-growth firms). And, to the extent that Tobin's q is a reliable proxy for a firm's investment opportunities, the stock market was expressing scepticism about the likely payoff from such investments.
There is a more favourable interpretation: these firms were better able to invest and thus were more successful in converting growth opportunities to assets. Weinstein and Yafeh ( 1998) suggest that the sceptical view is warranted. For while Japanese firms with close bank ties may have had greater access to funds when their operating cash flows declined, such access did not enable them to achieve higher profits or growth rates than their peers.
Peek and Rosengren (1998) In sum, one downside of a relationship-based sys tem is that price signals are obscured. The conse quence could be a widespread and costly misallocation of resources.
By contrast, there is a virtuous circle at work in market-based economies. In the process of relying on prices for guidance, the arm's-length transactions that predominate in these economies also have the beneficial effect of making prices more informative.
8 If anything, managerial empire building is less severe in a relationship-based system, precisely because financiers have the power to intervene extensively and absorb free cash flows from successful firms.
Thus, the more transactions that come into the market, the more likely it is that decisions made on the basis of price are the right ones.
Before leaving this section, it is useful to comment on the criticism that managers in market-based economies are too focused on the stock price. Their attempt to massage quarterly earnings to meet the market's incessant demand, it is alleged, makes them short term in outlook. It is true that managers are, on occasion, overly focused on the short-term bottom line-the amount of attention paid to ac counting for mergers to ensure that earnings are not 'diluted' far outweighs the importance the market attributes to these accounting gimmicks. Neverthe less, it is hard to make the case that managers in market economies do not invest for the long run.
After all, the millions of miles of optic fibre that were placed in the ground recently by the telecommunica tions industry were not motivated by immediate profit, but by the anticipation that uses would be found for them. It is another matter that the market system decided the uses were not really there, forcing a restructuring of the industry. In other words, given the significant amount of R&D that goes on in the United States, it is hard to argue that the short term is all that managers are focused on.
Market power
Another consequence of prices being obscured in a relationship-based system is that the financier's information is largely private, especially when the projects being financed consist of intangible assets such as intellectual property. Since the creation of intellectual assets requires substantial endeavour on the part of a firm's human capital, the rent-sharing entailed in a relationship-based system can depress effort, making innovation, especially of the entre preneurial kind in high-technology industries, a rare commodity.
Illiquidity
Because information is so concentrated in a rela tionship-based system, financial assets become very illiquid. Since the relationship is specific to the intermediary and borrower, the intermediary be comes indispensable to collecting on loans. As a result, the intermediary can extract sizeable rents from investors also (see Diamond and Rajan, 2001 a) because they need the intermediary's skills to real ize the value of the intermediary's loan portfolio.
Anticipating these rents, investors will charge the intermediary a high cost of capital. Moreover, the financial asset will be illiquid in the sense that it will trade in the market for true value (the amount that can be collected from borrowers) less the rent accruing to the intermediary because of its indispen sable relationship-specific skills. The illiquidity of financial assets makes it very costly for the financial system if the intermediaries get into trouble, since outsiders cannot take over their assets easily.
(iv) The Kinds of Assets Financed by Each
System
All this then suggests why pure relationship-based systems tend to have a comparative advantage in financing physical-asset-intensive industries rather than high-technology research-and-development based industries. For one, physical-asset-intensive industries are typically more traditional and well understood. As a result, the absence of market signals about their profitability is less likely to be a problem in making investment decisions. Second, because they are well understood, it is unlikely that a large amount of rents will accrue to the financing intermediary. Moreover, the borrower has the col lateral to entice fresh lenders if the existing ones prove overly demanding. Finally, since loans are well collateralized by physical assets, they are liquid, so the concentration of information in the system will not be a barrier to financing these assets.
Conversely, arm's-length systems will have a com parative advantage financing industries with intan gible assets; hence Carlin and Mayer's (1998) finding that equity-and skill-based industries tend to do more research and development in economies with better-developed accounting standards.
An intriguing recent study fortifies our view that relationship-based systems are more capable of financing projects where the ratio of tangible to intangible assets is large. Houston and James ( 1996) study the financing arrangements of 250 public firms in the United States. They find that firms with relationships to single banks tend to use less bank debt in proportion to total debt as their market-to book ratio (a measure of the ratio of intangible to tangible assets) increases. By contrast, when firms have relationships with multiple banks, those with higher market-to-book ratios tend to use more bank debt in proportion to total debt. This suggests that firms tend to avoid becoming dependent on a single bank when they have high market-to-book ratios, perhaps because they fear the bank may have too much power to extract rents and direct strategies, or because the bank itself will find the asset too illiquid.
By contrast, when the firm has multiple banking relationships (effectively an arm's-length system), no single bank has too much power. Since public markets can obtain information about the firm from multiple sources, the cost of borrowing more from banks is small relative to the insurance and advice provided by relationships. Thus the revealed prefer ence of firms, in an environment where they can choose the relationship structure that benefits them most, gives us a sense of when a relationship is onerous and when it is not.
So what is the bottom line? Do relationship-based systems help or hurt relative to market-based sys tems? Beck et al. (2001) seem to suggest the distinction does not matter. But our analysis thus far suggests there may be a more subtle relationship that Beck et al. (2001) may not pick up. In particu lar, Rajan and Zingales (19986) hypothesize that relationship-based financing may be particularly useful when institutions are underdeveloped, and when a country is underdeveloped so that the sectors that need investments are fairly clear. In such an environment, the market may not have the necessary infrastructural support to workwell; also, market signals may not be particularly informative (see Morck et al., 2000) or needed.
Tadesse (2000) We believe that the conditions under which venture capital arises ensure that the worst problems of the relationship-based system are tempered by the close proximity of the arm's-length system. The mistake is to view venture capital as purely a form of relationship-based financing. In fact, it seems an ideal bridge between relationship and arm's-length financing, combining the best of both worlds. Relationship-based finance, as we have seen, has the virtue that the financier has substantial control over the financed, and is able to guide the borrow er's moves, as well as thwart any malfeasance.
How can the venture capitalist bring these virtues to financing high technology without inflicting the costs associated with relationship-based financing?
In our view, the role of the venture capitalist is to reduce the illiquidity of the financed firm-which is the source of many of the ills of the relationship based system-and the existence of a vibrant arm ' s length market is crucial for him to perform his role. His constant endeavour after financing the firm initially is to prepare to exit. He does this by making the firm's management and control processes stand ardized, transparent, and easy for arm's-length investors to take over. The venture capitalist also moves the firm from being an organization depend ent on the founder to an organization capable of being run by professional managers. This again makes the firm easier for arm's-length investors to control, since managers are easier to replace than founders.9
Why does the venture capitalist not simply hold on to his stake in the firm and extract rents? The answer is that he obtains much greater returns from taking the firm public. The growth opportunities of the typical successful venture-capital-financed firm are so high that the venture capitalist would not be able to finance them in entirety without severely rationing his other ventures. Since his value-added is in origination, it makes sense for him to prepare the firm for the market and to let go when it is ready.
Moreover, venture-capital partnerships are struc tured with a limited life, which again serves as a commitment to let go of the firm. The market pays for the anticipated growth of the financed firm, which is a substantial reward to the venture capital ist for his services. Moreover, the need to exit via the market ensures that prices eventually do matter and discipline the investments that take place. Thus the incentives for innovation, the liquidity, and the price discipline provided by the market are combined through the venture capitalist with many of the benefits of control and long horizons provided by the relationship-based system.10
In sum, relationship-based systems can work very well in the early stages of industrialization where the industries to be financed are physical asset inten sive, where the legal system is ineffective, and where skill-based or idea-based industries are of limited import. But as economies develop and focus more on knowledge-intensive industries as engines for growth, a hybrid is perhaps more effective.
There is then the need to improve transparency, judicial efficiency, and mechanisms for speedy reso lution of financial distress so that arm's-length markets can function effectively and aid the process of economic growth.
IV. RISK
In the current economic situation, where America is ascendant while Japan is mired in bad loans, it is tempting to conclude that the arm's-length system dominates other forms. We believe that is a mis reading of the evidence. The United States does not have a purely arm's-length system; even so, to conclude that the system is optimal is probably as wrong as the conclusion in the late 1980s that the Japanese relationship-based system was worthy of emulation in its entirety. Nevertheless, if there is one thing the arm ' s-length system can do better than the relationship-based system, it is to bear and manage macroeconomic risk. Let us understand why.
(i) Why a Relationship-based System is More
Risky
We have already argued that assets financed by relationship-based systems tend to be illiquid since there is little transparency and disclosure. Diamond and Rajan (200la, b) argue that intermediaries can finance such assets at low cost only by issuing a high proportion of demandable claims. Intuitively, inter mediaries in relationship-based systems finance assets that only they understand. The only reason that they do not absorb a massive amount of rents as a result of their monopoly position is because they credibly commit to pay out collections to depositors. This requires them to issue hard claims; the hardest being demandable claims subject to runs. Thus, in the natural course of financing illiquid relationship based assets, financial intermediaries have to take on financial risk.
Risk can be mitigated if the intermediation system is well capitalized, because capital acts as a buffer.
Given the low levels of private capital in emerging economies, historically, the government has created capital for intermediaries by keeping the rates inter mediaries pay investors low. This has become infeasible as deregulation and competition has given investors more choice. Consequently, the task of averting the collapse of the system of intermediation in the face of severe macroeconomic volatility has shifted directly to the government. Governments have had to absorb risk by promising the intermedia tion system capital, implicitly or explicitly, in case the system is in danger. But the promise of such contin gent capital carries with it the risk that intermediar ies will collectively attempt to game the system through moral hazard.
In other words, illiquid assets can only be financed by financially fragile intermediaries, who then im pose risk on the system. To reduce risk, the govern ment has to promise intermediaries contingent capi tal, which in turn causes them to bet on the same risks such as real estate or emerging market lending, 10 It is interesting that German banks were performing a similar role to venture capital around the turn of the century, and German public markets were vibrant (Calomiris, 1994) . It would be useful to understand what changed.
knowing full well that they will be rescued only if they sink together.
Moreover, once a relationship-based system suf fers a severe shock that the government is not able to counter, the flow of credit can collapse quickly. This is because, first, there is a lot of specific knowledge and trust embedded in relationships that cannot be transferred to wealthy unaffected outsid ers. The illiquidity of the relationships prevents a quick takeover by, say, foreigners. Second, since property rights are not well established in relation ships, it becomes hard to separate healthy unaf fected parties from the walking dead. The ineffi ciency of the judicial system does not help. As a result, the relationship-based system tends to share the consequences of an adverse shock somewhat indiscriminately. It is no wonder then that outside capital does not flow in until the system essentially sorts itself out.
Contrast this with the arm's-length system where the accent is on providing small investors the confi dence to invest directly in firms. Clearly, such a system is better able to withstand shock, first, because the healthy can be distinguished from the terminally ill after a shock and can be dealt with differently and, second, because unaffected outsid ers have the ability to invest and revive the system, as they obtain confidence from the very same channels that inspire confidence in small inves tors.11 (ii) How to Reduce Risk in a Relationship based System
We have argued that elements of both relationship based and arm's-length financing are needed in the modern economy. Moreover, a combination of both may serve to reduce the risk of a financial melt down. But what if the economy is more primitive so that arm's length financing is not possible?
As Levine ( 1999) confidence that a financial crisis will not result in a total melt-down. As a result, the government will be less eager to bail out failed local banks. Moreover, the foreign banks offer an avenue for foreign inves tors to invest in the local economy despite the absence of safeguards necessary for arm's-length investing, thus shortening the duration of a purely financial crisis. But taken together, perhaps the most salutary effect is on domestic bank incentives.
Knowing that the government will be more reluctant to bail them out, they will be more careful about herding on certain systematic risks.
We do not, however, believe that emerging markets should unquestioningly open their doors to all forms of foreign capital before developing appropriate infrastructure. In the absence of well-developed markets or foreign intermediaries, foreign capital inflows have to be intermediated into the domestic economy by the domestic banking system. Foreign capital will demand substantial safeguards such as implicit or explicit seniority, and a short maturity, in return for putting money into a relatively opaque system.
Moreover, foreign capital has access to a wide range of opportunities outside the emerging market.
11 This is not to say that markets do not shut out particular firms. In fact, many banks advertise their relationship-based business as a port of safe haven for firms affected by a market storm. Nevertheless, we think it would be highly unusual for all world markets to be irrationally down on an entire country.
When coupled with their implicit seniority, the vola tility in their worldwide investment opportunities can lead to volatility in the movement of foreign capital.
While this may seem irrational because there may be no change in the country's fundamentals to justify the movement, the move may be completely rational in a more complete model. In opening up, countries have to estimate the risk-return trade-off from attracting capital but having to pay out on demand. The poorer a country's financial infra structure, and the lower its international credit rat ing, the less it will be able to service the out-flows. But these are also situations where foreign capital may be most beneficial to supplement domestic savings. Countries need to estimate the trade-off carefully.
All this also has implications for how countries should sequence financial reforms. The discussion above suggests the risk-minimizing way is first to undertake internal reforms: make the domestic economy more transparent, expand public informa tion availability, ensure that contracts are respected and enforced, ensure clear bankruptcy procedure, and put in place an adequate supervisory and regu latory infrastructure. However, as we argue in Raj an and Zingales (2001 ), such reforms may not be undertaken without the threat of foreign competi tion. This is why we believe that it may be necessary for a country to commit to a schedule of opening up its economy, even though there are well-known risks of opening up without undertaking internal reforms. The schedule is to ensure that there is some urgency behind the internal process, and it is not blocked by domestic interest groups.
V. CONCLUSION: AND THE WINNER IS... We started this paper by documenting that there does seem to be a causal relationship between financial development and economic growth.
Furthermore, financial development seems particu larly to help the financing of firms that typically do not get institutional credit because they lack physical collateral. This led us to a comparative analysis of relationship-based banking systems and arm ' s-length market-based systems. We concluded that for the kinds of industries that are now engines of world growth, a hybrid is probably best, though not all the best properties of each system survive in the hybrid.
Finally, we argue that improvements in the account ing, legal, and supervisory infrastructure, which are necessary to sustain a large banking system or arm's-length market, also tend to diminish risk.
From a policy perspective, it would appear that a country intent on economic development should fix its financial plumbing; specifically, its accounting and disclosure system and its legal and bankruptcy codes. It is a separate and important question as to whether this is equally feasible for all underdevel oped countries. Some studies (see Laporta et al., 1997 Laporta et al., ,1998 suggest that history may inflict on some countries deep structural impediments to their ever developing a good financial system. For example, the nature of the legal system may be one such impediment. Other studies are much less pessimis tic, attributing differences in financial development more to the current strength of private interests opposing development than to deep structural im pediments (see Pagano and Volpin (2000) ; or Rajan and Zingales (2001) , for example).
In particular, Rajan and Zingales (2001) argue that there are dramatic changes in a country's financial develop ment that are hard to explain by unchanging factors such as its legal origin. Instead, the current state of a country's financial development is probably best explained by the strength ofpolitical forces in favour of it, perhaps modified to some degree by the country's inherited structure.
Finally, it is tempting to anoint a specific country as having the best financial system. We want to refrain from this. One reason is that we have so much to leam about how financial systems work, even though we have come a long way in recent years. But perhaps a more important reason is that even a cursory study of a sample of the richest countries in the world will reveal a variety of financial systems.
Clearly, there are many paths to gold. While there are signs that indicate convergence to a hybrid (the United States using venture capital and Germany opening the New Market), these are far from conclusive.
Moreover, many of the stylized facts about the effects of particular systems-such as bank-oriented economies tend to have firms with more debt-tend to be illusory on a detailed exami nation of the facts (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995) .
At best, we conjecture that market-based systems are probably more likely to dominate in times of great industrial change, while bank-based systems may have an advantage when the other institutions in an economy are highly underdeveloped. There is, clearly, scope for future research.
